Challenge NAMA

If you had one question to ask about NAMA

Or one statement you would like to make challenging NAMA,

Or challenging the presence of individuals involved in NAMA,

Or the methods being used to set it up and or run it,

that you could put to Brendan McDonagh, NAMA, and Alan Ahearne, Advisor to the Finance Minister,

what would it or they be?

Please no trolling, this is a serious post, and remember your footnotes where neccessary.

What EXACT sequence of events will follow if a developer whose debt has been transfered to NAMA from one of the banks does not service that debt despite having personal wealth in his own name or in the name of close relatives?

IF/When this sequence of events is found to be “not legally possible after all, on advice from AG” who will be held accountable? Or will we be told that its no use crying over spilt milk.

Why do they keep lying a hole in a pot saying “it could break even” when it cannot?

I’ve never heard that idiom before.

Question number 1:
If NAMA is going to break even in the long term, why are the banks not being given an equity stake both to share in the return and to reduce the capital requirement of NAMA? This is, after all, the Swedish model, where the bad banks of the non-nationalised banks were owned and run by the banks themselves.

Question number 2:
How is it proposed to resolve the cross-collateralised loans and personal guarantees for developers who also owe money to non-NAMA eligible banks?

Bugger that’s two. Okay, question 1 only then.

Well, I mainly said that so the post wouldn’t be too long and there’d be a list of the most important questions.

Whom does it serve?

Question Number 3 of 1:
Is the necessity to recapitalise the banks if the haircut on the loans is too high affecting determinations on the purchase price?

Who are you saving the bondholders or the developers?

Why are you bailing out the bondholders?

Ownership of the Banks should be transfered to Bondholders. One of the recommendations put forward by the economics lecturer in UCD whose name escape me for the moment. Is that correct?

The standard reply at the moment seems to be that there is a Swedish economist (again, apologies, I’m terible with names, but I’m suire there’s someone else who knows it and can jump in here) who says this would be a bad idea and that if ownership were transfered to the banks it would make government borrowing more difficult/expensive as bondholders would be less inclined to lend. I beleive FG were also advocating something similar.

I thought the idea of transfering ownership was a good one based on the maxim that bondhoders make profits by taking risks and that part of taking risks is that sometiems you loose. Seemed very clean cut and moral to me.

There’s probably another thread discussing the Swedish economist, isn’t there?

I’d be very interested in hearing anyone’s opinion on the issue of the “FG plan versus the Swedish Econmists warning”, if you want to continue or start a new thread.

Can you guarantee that no developer, bank employee, bank director or politician will personally profit at the expense of the taxpayer from the taxpayers bailout of banks and developers?

Can you guarantee that no developer, bank employee, bank director or politician is a bondholder?

Can you guarantee that insider trading will not take place with taxpayers money?

Can you price the bailout. A full and final price.

In the event the above guarantees are broken, who should be shot?

I don’t think anyone anywhere anywhen could do that for nama or any of the other plans.
Am I correct to think "Can you guarantee that no developer, bank employee, bank director or politician is a bondholder?
" is most important?

Not sure about the swedish economist, the only swedes I’ve heard from that were involved in Securum or the other swedish bad banks recommend that there be a private sector solution for the most part with each bank setting up its own bad bank, so NAMA would only be for Anglo and any other nationalised bank. The governments role would be to guarantee new debt issued by these vehicles, not to buy the loans. And, yes, bondholder convert to equity was part of the solution in Sweden, I believe as the nationalised banks were refloated.

"Can you summarize the arms-length principles you will be using when getting the best value for Irish taxpayers "

We will apply multivariate statistical regressions on the length of the arms of each developer in a procedure we will call “chancing your arm”. This is too sophistimicated to explain to the ordinary Joe who in any event only has the attention span of a gnat these days. We are confident that Joe will be too busy /fiddling with his Sky+ box/watching RTE News/Internet Porn/commuting insane distances/working his ass off for less pay and higher taxes/complaining about Nigerians/revarnishing his slimy decking/destroying his liver/deleting his spam/ to bother himself with such arcane details.