Well we are frequently told that persecuting the jews is racist and all. Equal oportunity confusion out there amoung all the silly auld hate.
“12 years”,“Equitable title”, “Ben Gilroy”, “Tiger reborn”
An oldie but still a goodie …and ne’er a one evicted from their home…
That’s an incredibly erroneous assumption to make.
Many lost their homes.
However, they did so without the Strokestown or O’Donnell fireworks, preferring a more quiet ‘resolution’.
Not hearing or reading about someone losing their home does not mean it didn’t happen.
For every O’Donnell who tried to fight the repossession every step of the way, you have far more who chose to slip quietly out the back door.
It’s also important to highlight from your own link ‘Many of the loans were performing – where interest or capital was being repaid – at the time the bank was liquidated.’.
The list were not people in arrears, but just high-profile borrowers.
Some were in arrears, many not. No precise breakdown was given.
Also, the method of sale was slightly different.
In co-operating with a bank, the borrower was often allowed stay in the house while it was for sale.
It gave the impression that the sale was voluntary and not forced, thereby saving face.
Have to agree with Mr A. In addition many of these individuals did not have their houses up as collateral against the loans - the rich have ways to do this that lesser mortals do not. This is the thing we need to end - since the early 1980s the economic model that we have followed in the west has encouraged the privatisation of profits and the socialisation of losses - this is only to the benefit of the rich - the losses of the poor are still penalised - it leads to the concentration of wealth. The only way we can change this is to educate people to vote for politicians who do not believe in this model, and to educate the politicians who say they don’t believe in it on how to change it (Eoin Ó Broin - are you listening? - in your review on a book on the housing crisis you talk about the ‘thorny’ problem of property taxes - it ain’t thorny son - it is the only wealth tax that we have in this country and it’s a great place to start taxing wealth - that’s why the books authors mention it - you might have to eat a bit of humble pie and call it something else - but it is a neccessity, it’s on the statute books and could be easily tweaked to satisfy most people on the left - everybody is scared to touch it because they know there’s a bunch of people out there who want to portray it as the new water charges - all you are doing is keeping a bunch of very wealthy people very happy)
I think if we want to increase protection of PPRs we have to ban banks from using PPRs as collateral for loans taken out for business and investment purposes. Similarly for agricultural loans the loan will have to use land rather than PPRs as collateral. This would prove difficult for the banks as they seem to have great difficulty lending to a business based on the likelihood of the success of the business as this would require them to do some due diligence on the business plan rather than taking the lazy route of mortgaging the PPR - I refused a business loan when I was told the only way I could get it was to put up my PPR - I was already putting up 60% of the capital myself. Another beneficial side effect of this would be an end to borrow-to-let which has been this country’s financial cancer.
In general what I hear from people working in the banks is that early engagement with the banks allowed many people to stay in their homes on plans that were ultimately beneficial to both parties. However I think it likely that some people engaged too early and did not benefit from the bounce - it’s also possible they got bigger write-offs so maybe it balances out. People who didn’t engage had their loans sold off to the debt collection agencies - this is standard practice in all lending - for most debts it goes 30, 60, 90 days - Debt Collection. For a PPR it will go longer as the bank often has other relationships with the customer. However if you mess with them they know they don’t have the patience and/or the ability to deal with these kind of situations , they also don’t want the kind of ugly publicity that these customers can raise. KBC knew that the Roscommon customer was going to be awkward - it seems strange (arrogant?) that they could believe that they could handle this themselves.
Well if you can’t repo a PPR then banks aren’t going to secure business loans with them in future, which means less credit for small businesses. That’s just going to concentrate wealth further.
Debt enables social mobility. It’s a force for social good. But you can’t have debt without security, and security is worthless if you can’t repo.
If I was running an Irish bank I’d be tempted to shut down rural lending and focus on the cities where this bullshit is less likely.
It’s kind of an a priori thing - the only reason to set up a HPP unit is to treat borrowers in the HPP unit differently to others. You seem to be saying that because of their profile they’ll want to save face and co-operate. That might be the case for some. But this is Ireland. It’s equally or more likely that they’re grouped to get preferential treatment and just a general higher level of understanding
I don’t accept all of what you say here Mr. Anderson.
I really don’t.
We don’t really have proof of this either way since the information is privileged, private and confidential in the way that all special deals done in Ireland are.
This is why it’s not really possible to make this statement without a full detail of the facts.
I think that you recognize the importance of this yourself when you indicate that “No precise breakdown was given.”
But here is what we do know, that essentially goes to the heart of the matter of the flaws in the Irish system of financial justice,
- Private Institutions got access to write laws and get them pushed through, using powers of fear and intimidation, the Bank Bailout legislation.
- Private Developers got paid large, social welfare style handouts, 125,000 Euros per year or thereabouts, to maintain “management” of their failed developer businesses. This law was written for them by their political cronies.
- Little action from a legal point of view has been taken against the ringleaders of the Planning corruption that was discovered by the Mahon Tribunal. Why not?
All of this is really very Irish but it is playing straight into the hands of more unwelcome sorts that would “take the law into their own hands”, but sure why wouldn’t they since that’s how the Government have operated in this country for nearly forever.
I’m not able to dig them out right now on but I’m pretty sure there are published statistics about which show that voluntary surrenders outnumber possession orders by a substantial amount. And that wouldn’t even capture the agreed sales.
What legislation specifically and which private institutions got to write these laws? It seems odd, if we’re talking about the banks, that we’ve still got one of the most borrower friendly repossession regimes in Europe?
This was done for some developers and not others, ostensibly in the basis of whether they cooperated with NAMA or not, but probably there was some cronyism involved too. It wasn’t based on any legislation that I’m aware of? What legislation are you referring to?
Yes, and that is shameful.
But a lot of that is driven by perception rather than reality. The banks apparently “got away scot free” according to those who advocate vigilante resistance but bank shareholders who lost huge chunks of their savings might disagree with that analysis.
The liquidator of IBRC (formerly Anglo&INBS) gave a report a few weeks ago.
They have brought €21bn of loans by value to market in the last five years.
This seems to have gone better than expected, as unsecured creditors (including the state) will be in receipt of funds they didn’t expect to get in 2013.
The simple fact is that many of the high-profile borrowers were likely performing (at a push), especially given the very strong increase since 2014 in Irish rents, particularly commercial.
Regarding Nama, the sad fact is that very big borrowers never lose their shirt, in Ireland or anywhere else. Even if these loans had stayed on the books of the big banks, and they had been pushed into liquidation, the borrowers (mainly developers) would have remained on large fees in order to maintain good relationships with clients and staff.
Is this one law for the rich and one for the poor? Yes, but there is not much that can be done about it.
We should never have to accept graft as a fact of life. We all know it is endemic, but society should try to make some attempts to address it. Racism, dependence on charitable acts and extreme poverty where once considered a fact of life, and the norm. Until some civic leaders refused to accept that way of thinking, be that the civil rights activists of the 60s or the Attlee government of the 40s.
Sadly we are badly lacking in such leadership in the politics of today. Being kettled as we are into various trifles of little real consequence.
Limited liability has been woven deeply into the fabric of modern capitalism ever since (I think) the invention of the joint stock company. This seems to be ignored or misunderstood in the public commentary on the Irish crash. Property developers “getting away with it” is capitalism working as designed. Individual companies are supposed to be able to fail harmlessly, with labour and assets redistributed in the economy.
Despite improvements to macroprudential regulation which will probably prevent an exact repeat of the previous crash, the country is really not much more robust to shocks than it was last time round. At least in the last crash there were bad guys to point fingers at. I think Ireland has recovered partly because there was an obvious target for the rage.
If the next crash is caused by a collapse in corporation tax revenues (currently around €9bn a year, heading towards 20% of total tax take, compared to something like 7% in a normal economy), who will be to blame then?
Undirected rage causes societal malaise.
Leaving aside its life before Drumm left, It’s actually comical that you would cite the nationalisation and then liquidation of IBRC as anything other than a debacle. The central debacle trumps any and all realisation efforts. There was 31 billion injected to cover loan losses (and whatever else). The citizenry have NO IDEA how that was applied against the loan book on an item by item basis.
How many frauds and lost documents hidden in the 31 billion ? No idea.
How many write offs and to whom ? No idea
@gameblame I very clearly mentioned the liquidation of IBRC (starting 2013), not the guarantee and nationalisation of Anglo&INBS, (2008-2013). You’re right that no one knows what kind of write-downs or treatment the borrowers got. But that’s banking. Loans go bad all the time, and the details are kept private. Public sector bodies don’t routinely reveal the details of commercial contracts, or the treatment of when they write off bad debts from creditors gone bad. This is why you have various levels of oversight including external audit, but there is no magic spreadsheet anywhere where it all gets publicised. In fact the Strokestown case is interesting too - this wasn’t a state bank, and the sums involved were trivial, but even then what is striking is how little the jouranlists were able to find that was in the public domain.
@epicurus I have no doubt there was graft at certain points in the bank bailout and subsequent treatment of borrowers. The issue is as to whether it was graft on a grand scale. I guess that’s a matter of opinion (I don’t think so_, but if it is maybe talk to the various majorities of TDs who voted through all the policies at different points.
Rubbish - a PEP list is a regulatory requirement for all financial entities in Europe.
You think Rugby players and celebrities get separated out in a French bank report to its central bank ?
We’re talking about 31 BILLION here. Not bad debt write offs in the rates department of a county council. I don’t think there is external audit of IBRC btw.
There are plenty of ways that transparency could have been injected into the process. Very little of what went on post 2008 there could be described as “that’s banking”. If you set up an ideas thread here you’d get 10 good legal ideas. The only reasonable conclusion as to why there was no transparency designed into this is that transparency wasn’t wanted.
Not true - there are guidelines on identifying PEPs as part of the Know Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering regulations and it is advised that Financial Institutions should be aware of such persons - however there has never been as far as I know (and I worked with banks for many years and until very recently) any regulation relating to this - I suspect that this is because it is very difficult to define a PEP in a way that is sufficiently rigorous to put it into a regulation.