How many pages - 2008 Bank Guarantee

Can anyone remember off the top of their heads how many pages the legislation ran to that brought in the Bank guarantee that very fateful night when the Dáil voted for it back in step 2008.

Please link if you have it handy. :wink:

The PDF runs to 24 pages. It’s Statutory Instrument number 411 of 2008: Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Scheme 2008. It was the one that guaranteed both deposits and bondholders. There were two additional S.Is on foot of it in 2009 relating to deposit guarantees, the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act 2009, and the Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme 2009.

Funny you should mention that. I was thinking just the other day about where the “missing” 30B/40B of deposits that came and left Anglo in the early / mid 2000’s actually came from. The deposits whose flight made Anglo insolvent. Given the active participation of the Coolmore Mafia in the events of that night of the Bank Guarantee, McManuses zero footprint FX trading “empire”, Mangiers even odder business profile, and the fact that the buying and selling of Anglos (alleged) money laundering Austrian subsidiary overlaps pretty much with the comings and goings of the tens of billions of hot deposits would seem to indicate that is was probably a straight money laundering operation.

Then there is mystery of why the more than ten billion of losses by Anglos derivatives trades was never properly investigated or brought to trial. Those Anglo derivative trades losses were far more egregious that either Kerival or Nick Leeson. Let alone the initial panic decision of the Bank Guarantee, which the government knew would have huge political ramifications in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Frankfurt. Or the utterly supine way the Government reacted when ordered in a rather offhand fashion by the Germans into IMF receivership.

So unless I’m mistaken it looks like we have a two part scandal here. First was Anglos multi tens of billions money laundering scheme which reached its peak during the mid 2000’s. Deposits which Anglo then used to make 10B’s of loans on the back of. They reached 70B by the time they went bankrupt. The second part of the scandal was the attempts by the other banks, with the active participation of the CB in the end stages, of covering up Anglos hemorrhaging of these hot deposits from 2005 onwards by using inter bank cross deposits to cover up the fact that Anglo was insolvent. By 2008 BOI, AIB, the CB had a cross depositing chain of more than 30B to cover up Anglos insolvency.

Which is why Anglo had to be part of the bank guarantee. If it had not and Anglo had gone bust then the cross deposit chain would have collapsed and come to light very quickly. And both BOI and AIB would be very very insolvent. Not just insolvent. I think if only BOI and AIB had been part of the deposit chain and it had been much smaller, less than 5B, then Anglo would have left to go bust. It was the fact that the cross deposits seem to have been over 30B and that the CB was an active participant in the cross deposit chain is why Anglo had to be saved. The cover up went right to the very top. There is no way the Irish CB at the time would have got involved in what is basically cheque kiting without getting the say so from the very top.

What gives extra weight to the cover up theory is the fact that the most senior FF people took a decision that they knew at the time stood a good chance of destroying the party. Which it almost did. In the end they were only saved by the utter cowardice of the Greens. Given FF’s utter ruthlessness regarding itself and its survival, FFs priorities have always been Party, Supporters, and far behind Country and Everyone else, the fact that the most senior FF people took the decisions they did in 2008/2009 tells me that they were faced with a situation which must have been truly catastrophic if they were willing to put the survival of the party in any sort of jeopardy.

But given the way Ireland has a long tradition of ignoring awkward facts of history and telling itself fairy tails and calling it history I’m sure the Anglo money laundering tale and its cover up will be buried as completely as Sean McBrides utterly catastrophic dealings with the IMF and Marshall Plan in the late 1940’s. Which played a very large part in turning Ireland from an undamaged and quietly prosperous country sitting on an immense cash trading surplus in 1945 into an economic basket case on the verge of demographic collapse less than a decade later. Another very interesting tale which I strongly suspect will never be told. Might raise some very awkward questions. Too many awkward questions.

anglo shares


I found this quote quite interesting.

Can you provide a link or further info or suggest some further reading in relation to this.

(I’m not being smart, I’m genuinely interested - Please excuse my naivety, it’s not an episode that I’m familiar with)

The proof that the government knew full well that Anglo was insolvent is the ‘Letter of Comfort’ that was issued to Anglo on the night of the guarantee. The State was forbidden from offering assistance to an insolvent institution but the ‘Letter of Comfort’ converted Anglo from an insolvent institution to a solvent one. It was a formality that could only have been done if they knew that Anglo was insolvent.

That is the smoking gun that proves the crime. Of course it wasn’t just FF. A certain ‘Enda K’ was kept fully informed of the plan in the months prior to it.

viewtopic.php?p=468907#p468907 … 36123.html

“The Atlantic Economy: Britain, the US and Ireland” By Denis O’Hearn

You get a sense of it from the preview pages google books allows, page 125 onwards.

You’ll see TK Whittaker warning against so much borrowing for ‘social’ spending.

I did some serious digging about 5 years ago and could find nothing substantive on the subject. At least nothing that had any kind of plausible explanation. What first piqued my interest was I was reading about something quite unrelated, France and the Marshall Plan and the arguments over the trigger for the post war Les Trente Gloriouse, and I saw a table of year by years disbursements from the Fund by country in a publication from the 1950’s or 1960’s. What was most startling was that Ireland was the only country which had received funds during the first few years that had an almost total cutoff of funds in later years. Whereas countries like Sweden and Switzerland, which had been unconditional neutrals, had a ramp up of funding in later years so by the end they had received far more money per capita than Ireland. The reduction in funding for Ireland during the life of the fund was unique.

The only real clue I could find as to the politics of Irelands involvement in the earlier years of the Marshall Plan was references in papers about the Sterling Crisis of 1947 and its role in the creation of the Marshall Plan to the US trying to tie the huge Sterling surplus which Ireland had, about 200 million, to its participation in the various stages. The US position seems to have been quite reasonable. Ireland was uniquely placed after the war in having a huge sterling surplus, an undamaged country, and a huge, ready and lucrative market for all it could produce. So the US wanted Ireland to participate by swap agreements using its surplus against raw materials and dollars, structured as loans. The politics involved is all rather murky, deliberately so, but it seems MacBride found this utterly unacceptable because of Irelands “unique” history as “most oppressed people ever” and would only accept outright no strings attached “grants”. Basically as reparations for all the oppression the Irish had “suffered” since 1170.

Given that at the time most of western europe was in ruins, its industry destroyed, with tens of millions on starvation rations, and the Soviets were shooting eastern europeans by the tens of thousands after sending hundreds of thousands to the gulags, the Irish government seems to have been told in no uncertain terms the diplomatic equivalent of go fuck yourself and all subsequent funding from Marshall Plan was pretty much cut off. And the 200 million in the Sterling surplus basically locked down and unusable. Setting the scene for the total implosion of the Irish economy by the mid 50’s due to demographic collapse.

Remember, post war, Ireland was treated internationally exactly the same as the Axis belligerent client states. Thats why it was only allowed to join the UN in 1955. The same time as the other Axis countries. And Franco’s Spain. Dev’s attempt at a cute hoor stroke with trying to sell its “Neutrality” in 1940 had some very serious long term consequences for the country. All bad.

If you want to get a feel for what an arrogant narcissistic reptilian prick MacBride was this very soft ball interview by John Pilger in the early 1980’s gives a bit of an idea. Pilger was an exceptionally favorable and uncritical interviewer but MacBride still comes over a very nasty operator. I remember seeing less sycophantic interviews at the time, still very softball, when MacBrides arrogance and bullying nature showed itself more readily. A very nasty piece of work. Why do you think he was so obsessed with getting every award, prize and gong going at the time. Especially from the Communists.


Funny how both of the two most politically disastrously doctrinaire republicans of the last 150 years were both foreigners. Him and Dev.

You do know the guy is a marxist American sociologist and a republican apologist with no background in economics, history or anything of any relevance to the subject. Just more lefty agitprop posing as scholarship.

The one thing these people can never explain away is that fact that if Ireland had been so economically oppressed before and after the union why did Belfast and the Lagan Valley become one of the main centers of the Industrial Revolution in the British Isles? And why, at least until economic targets were deliberately attacked during the Troubles, NI was so good at growing the new sectors like light engineering and chemicals post 1920.

In the 20’th century all Irelands (ROI) economic woes have been self inflicted. A quick comparative history with small country economies like Finland and Norway (pre oil) during the 20’th century will illustrate just how much domestic political decisions have been responsible for its indigenous sectors under-performance over the decades.

So the book is both irrelevant and worthless as a source of informed non-ideologically driven opinion on the subject.

Thank you, will check it out

Thank you for the additional information.
I’m always happy to read and learn. It’s unfortunate that so much of Irish history is so censored that all we get is the dumbed down version that seems to be tailored for American tourists.
I’ll still read the book if I get a copy. No harm getting other viewpoints and drawing my own conclusions.