In your NWL link, from the discussion with Who Shot the Tiger (WSTT), it would seem that WSTT either works for Bank Check (the company seeking to drum up business from this) or one of its competitors (commenting that he/she was currently completing interest checks for clients). It is this entity (BankCheck) which is citing the 500mm but I note it is itself aligned with some developers who were challenging IBRC’s chapter 15 protection request in the US - Bank Check submission under docket 88 (I haven’t looked at this yet). While the head of Bankcheck made a presentation to the Oireachtas in 2008 along with “Friends of Banking Ireland” (Mr. Jerry Beades ) I don’t think this link has continued.
Given I haven’t seen BankCheck’s submission & Peter Mathew’s/Declan Ganley’s comments/exhibits don’t include any supporting evidence relating to “fraudulent” misspricing of base rates pre 2004 - I would refrain from calling anything fraudulent at present.
What I find odd is the fact that this is a simple calculation to do (reference rates are publicly published & everyone has excel) - how would it be possible that this was endemic and no one picked up on it and no one challenged it in the courts?
Either way, i think these should be classed as unsecured creditors which could be the best result from the taxpayer. I would expect some debtor’s who can repay their debt may seek to have the balance due offset by the overcharged amount (they could face problems though if their debt was sold to an other owner).
EDIT - having reviewed the Bank Check docket, he states that he reviewed a large number of Anglo loans (270+) & and found base rate discrepancies from 1990 onwards ranging from 50bps in the early 1990’s to single digit basis points in 2003 & 2004. He notes that some of these discrepancies relate to different interpretations of the loan facilities (Anglo disputing the meaning of certain T&C’s). However, the crux of his submission was a request for discovery whereby he was seeking access to nearly all treasury communications from 1990 onwards (emails, phone calls, memos) and all Anglo board minutes. This seems a bit like fishing.
His numbers are a little odd. He claims he examined over 270 loan accounts (240 variable rate Euribor/DIBOR loans, 17 LIBOR loans & 15 other currency loans). However, he then goes onto say 524 separate (different dates - i assume he means interest reset dates) were found to be “loaded”. There is 250+ possible reset dates p.a. so without outlining the full details it’s difficult to draw a conclusion 250 by 13 years is 3,250 reset dates (were all the loans being reset on the same days (quarter end, month end etc)). He found consistency in the rate variances in 1992 (0.377%), 1993 (0.483%) and 1994 (0.435%) but noted that subsequent (post 1994) rate variances were erratic/random. He claims Flynn was overcharged by Eur 7.7mm (50% of which was due to disputed terms). It’s very interesting - I must see if IBRC responded in court to his allegations.